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BP Amoco Production Co. v. Watson
(05-669)
Ruling Below: (Amoco Production Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d 722 (D.C., 2005). cert granted 126
S. Ct. 1768; 74 U.S.L.W. 3584 [2006]).
Under the Mineral Leasing Act, plaintiff must pay royalties to the government for gas extracted
from leased lands. Plaintiff deducted the cost of removing carbon dioxide from the gas it was
extracting from the royalties it paid, although the lease required them to do so for free. Plaintiff
claims that the statute of limitations prevents the Department of the Interior from collected the
additional royalties, while the DOI claims the statute of limitations does not apply here because
the suit was not an action for money damages.
Question Presented: Whether-contrary to the decision below but consistent with decisions of
the Tenth and Federal Circuits-the limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) applies to federal
agency orders requiring the payment of money claimed under a lease or other agreement.
Global Crossing, Inc. v. Metrophones, Inc.
(05-705)
Ruling Below: (Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. v. Global Crossing, 423 F.3d 1056 (9'
Cir. 2005), cert granted 126 S. Ct. 1329, 74 U.S.L.W. 3471 [2006]).
Metrophones sued Global Crossing, a long distance telephone service, for violating the
Communications Act, claiming that Global had not reimbursed Metrophones for use of its pay
phones. Global's customers used a toll-free number to access the long distance service from a
payphone and did not pay Metrophones for use of the payphone. Global claims that Metrophones
does not have a private right to sue for damages under the Communications Act, but the Ninth
Circuit, deferring to the FCC's interpretation of the statute, held that Metrophones may sue.
Question Presented: Whether 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 creates a
private right of action for a provider of payphone services to sue a long distance carrier for
alleged violations of the FCC's regulations concerning compensation for coinless payphone calls.
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James v. United States
(05-9264)
Ruling Below: (U.S. v. James, 430 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2005)., cert granted 165 L. Ed. 2d 894,
74 U.S.L.W. 3685 [2006]).
James plead guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the government sought to
increase his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), under which the
government can increase sentences if the criminal has three prior convictions for serious drug
offenses or violent felonies. The district court did not increase his sentence, holding that an
attempted burglary did not count as a violent crime under the ACCA. The 11 Circuit
determined that a drug trafficking conviction was a serious offense and that an attempted
burglary could count towards a violent felony, and increased James' sentence under the ACCA.
Question Presented: Whether the Eleventh Circuit erred by holding that all convictions in
Florida for attempted burglary qualify as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), creating a
circuit conflict on the issue.
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Inc.
(05-1074)
Ruling Below: (Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Inc., 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir.
2005)., cert granted 74 U.S.L.W. 3720 [2006]).
Ledbetter sued the tire company alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act that resulted in her being paid less than male coworkers over a 19 year career and was
awarded $360,000 in damages. Goodyear appealed, noting that a plaintiff is required to file a
complaint within 180 days of an allegedly discriminatory decision. Since Goodyear periodically
reviews employee salaries, on appeal the court held that Ledbetter could only recover damages
for pay periods for which she could prove intentional discrimination that were within the statute
of limitations. Because Ledbetter could not prove intentional discrimination for the periods
during the statute of limitations, she could not recover damages.
Question Presented: Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination when the
disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally
discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period.
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Marrama v. Citizens Bank of MA
(05-996)
Ruling Below: (In re Marrama, 430 F.3d 474 (1st Cir. 2005)., cert granted 165 L. Ed. 2d 894;
74 U.S.L.W. 3685 [2006]).
Marrama filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and claimed that a trust that he owned had no value,
when in fact he had transferred real estate worth $85,000 into that trust. Marrama later moved to
convert his filing into a chapter 13 bankruptcy so he could maintain control over the asset.
Citizens Bank, one of his creditors, argued that he should not be able to convert his filing since
he had filed in bad faith by attempting to conceal an asset. The bankruptcy court denied
Marrama's conversion and the First Circuit upheld, holding that since the goal of the bankruptcy
court is to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system, the court could deny conversions for bad
faith.
Question Presented: Whether the right to convert a chapter 7 bankruptcy case to another
chapter can be denied notwithstanding the plain language of the statute and the legislative
history.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
(05-608)
Ruling Below: (Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005)., cert
granted 126 S. Ct. 1329; 74 U.S.L.W. 3471 [2006]).
Medlmmune sued Genentech for declaratory judgment that a patent that Medlmmune was
licensing from Genetech was invalid or unenforceable after Genentech settled a patent dispute
over that patent with a separate company. The district court granted Genentech's motion to
dismiss the matter for failing to meet the "actual controversy" requirement of Article III, since
MedImmune was still paying Genentech royalties under the licensing agreement, and therefore
was not in danger of being sued by Genentech for breach of the agreement.
Question Presented: Does Article Ill's grant of jurisdiction of "all Cases . . . arising under ...
the Laws of the United States," implemented in the "actual controversy" requirement of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), require a patent licensee to refuse to pay
royalties and commit material breach of the license agreement before suing to declare the patent
invalid, unenforceable or not infringed?
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Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell
(05-746)
Ruling Below: (Sorrell v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 170 S.W.3d 35 (Mo.App. E.D.,2005)., cert
granted 126 S. Ct. 2018; 74 U.S.L.W. 3639 [2006]).
Sorrell, an employee of Norfolk Southern, sued the company under the Federal Employers
Liability Act for compensation for injuries he received while attempting to avoid another
Norfolk Southern truck on a narrow road. Norfolk Southern claims that under the FELA, the
same standard of negligence must be applied to both parties, and therefore Sorrell's damages
must be decreased by the amount of his own negligence. The court held that the contributory
negligence standard only required them to decrease damages by the amount that the plaintiffs
negligence directly caused the damage and awarded Sorrell $1.5 million.
Question Presented: Whether the court below erred in determining-in conflict with this Court
and multiple courts of appeals-that the causation standard for employee contributory negligence
under the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA ") differs from the causation standard for
railroad negligence.
Osborn v. Haley
(05-593)
Ruling Below: (Osborn v. Haley, 422 F.3d 359 (6th Cir., 2005)., cert granted 165 L. Ed. 2d 894;
74 U.S.L.W. 3685 [2006]).
Osborn, a private contractor working for the US Forest Service, sued Haley, a Forest Service
employee, alleging that Haley influenced Osborn's employer to fire her. The United States
certified that Haley was acting within the scope of his employment and invoked the Westfall Act,
which grants immunity to government employees for torts within the scope of their employment,
and removed the suit to federal court. Osborn alleged that Haley's actions were not within the
scope of his employment, and the district court accepted this allegation and remanded the case to
state court. On appeal the 6th Circuit held that the allegations should not have been automatically
accepted, and that a federal court cannot remand a matter involving the Westfall Act to a state
court, since the Act raises a federal question.
Questions Presented: 1. Whether the Westfall Act authorizes the Attorney General to certify
that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the
incident solely by denying that such incident occurred at all.
2. Whether the Westfall Act forbids a district court to remand an action to state court upon
concluding that the Attorney General's purported certification was not authorized by the Act.
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U.S. v. Resendiz-Ponce
(05-998)
Ruling Below: (U.S. v. Resendiz-Ponce, 425 F.3d 729 (9th Cir., 2005)., cert granted 126 S. Ct.
1776; 74 U.S.L.W. 3584 [2006]).
Resendiz-Ponce was convicted of attempting to reenter the US after being deported. He moved
to dismiss the indictment because it did not allege the element of an overt act on his part, which
is an element of a criminal indictment required by prior case law. The court of appeals held that
the lack of an overt act in the indictment was not a harmless error and was cause to dismiss the
indictment.
Question Presented: Whether the omission of an element of a criminal offense from a federal
indictment can constitute harmless error.
Wallace v. City of Chicago
(05-1240)
Ruling Below: (Wallace v. City of Chi. , 440 F.3d 421 (7th Cir., 2006)., cert granted 126 S. Ct.
1776; 74 U.S.L.W. 3584 [2006]).
Wallace was arrested and convicted of first degree murder, then the Illinois Appellate Court
found that his arrest had been without probable cause and he was granted a new trial. Wallace
later sued the city and two detectives for false arrest, and the city argued that his claim was
barred by the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit Court upheld Chicago's motion for
summary judgment, holding that Wallace would have needed to sue within two years of his
arrest to meet the statute of limitations.
Question Presented: When does a claim for damages arising out of a false arrest or other
search or seizure forbidden by the Fourth Amendment accrue when the fruits of the search were
introduced in the claimant's criminal trial and he was convicted?
Watters v. Wachovia Bank
(05-1342)
Ruling Below: (Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005)., cert granted 165 L.
Ed. 2D 915; 74 U.S.L.W. 3702 [2006]).
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Wachovia Mortgage registered under Michigan law to make mortgage loans in that state, and
later merged with Wachovia Bank, a national bank. Wachovia Mortgage surrendered its lending
registration in Michigan, and was told by the state that it could no longer conduct lending there.
Wachovia sued Watters, Commissioner of the Michigan Office of Insurance and Financial
Services, seeking a declaration that Michigan is preempted from regulating national banks by the
National Bank Act, and an injunction preventing Michigan from stopping its lending in the state.
The district court and the Sixth Circuit upheld Wachovia's motion for summary judgment.
Questions Presented: 1. 12 USC § 484(a) of the National Bank Act limits visitorial powers
over "national banks" except as authorized by federal law. National banks are defined and
created under the National Bank Act. State-chartered nonbank operating subsidiaries of national
banks are created under State corporate law. The Comptroller of the Currency, by Rule 12 CFR
7.4006, made 12 USC § 484(a) equally applicable to State-chartered nonbank "operating
subsidiaries" of national banks. Is the interpretation of the Comptroller of the Currency that 12
CFR 7.4006 preempts Michigan's laws regulating mortgage lending as applied to State chartered
nonbank operating subsidiaries, entitled to judicial deference under Chevron USA, Inc v Natural
Resources Defense Council?
2. A national bank has been declared to be a national corporation in Guthrie v Harkness. 12 CFR
7.4006 treats a State-chartered nonbank operating subsidiary of a national bank as equivalent to a
national bank and, thus, as a national corporation. The Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution is violated to the extent a statute permits the conversion of State corporations into
federal ones in contravention of the laws of the place of their creation. Hopkins v Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n v Cleary. Does 12 CFR 7.4006, by equating a State-chartered nonbank
operating subsidiary with a national bank for purposes of federal preemption of State regulation,
violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
555
OTHER
"Exploring the Myths About the Ninth Circuit"
Arizona Law Review
Summer 2006
Stephen J. Wermiel
[Excerpt:]
When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit issued its original ruling
invalidating the Pledge of Allegiance in
2002, the decision provoked a flood of
thoughtful commentary and debate in
newspapers and academic journals. It also
produced another type of reaction, reflected
in the remarks of Speaker of the U.S. House
of Representatives Dennis Hastert
(Republican, Ill.), who said, "Obviously, the
liberal Court in San Francisco has gotten this
one wrong."
Hastert's comment is just one example of a
perception held by many politicians, legal
commentators, and journalists that the
country's largest court of appeals-it covers
nine states and two territories, and presently
has twenty-eight active judges authorized
and twenty-three senior judges-is a bastion
of liberalism run amok. In its most persistent
form, this perception holds that the Ninth
Circuit is so out of control that the Supreme
Court of the United States must devote
considerable time and energy to reining in
the judges and correcting their decisions.
This Essay suggests that the Ninth Circuit
suffers less from a genuine runaway
tendency toward renegade judicial
decisionmaking and more from a
bandwagon effect of political criticism
perpetuated by media commentary.
Moreover, the sometimes breathless
fascination with Supreme Court reversals of
Ninth Circuit decisions, as if to suggest
revelation of an important new trend,
reflects a very short memory. Precisely the
same controversy occurred in the early
1980s, coinciding roughly with the
discovery by young Reagan Administration
conservatives that they could gain political
mileage out of calling attention to the
frequency of Ninth Circuit reversals by the
Supreme Court. The controversy was
substantial at the time. As Harvard Law
School Professor Laurence Tribe suggested
in the Los Angeles Times with respect to the
1980s controversy, "The rate at which that
court's decisions were reversed by the
Supreme Court last term has no genuine
significance, and certainly does not prove
there was any attempt by the Supreme Court
to 'discipline' the 9th Circuit's judges."
I. THE CONTROVERSY
The premise at the core of the controversy is
that judges of the Ninth Circuit march to
their own frequently liberal beat, do not
heed the rulings of the Supreme Court, and
are out of step with the High Court's
direction. This premise manifests itself in
two ways:
One manifestation is that legal scholars and
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media and political commentators follow the
Supreme Court's reversal rates of the
various circuits with a statistical fascination
equaled only in fantasy baseball leagues.
This results in dissemination of numbers
showing frequent reversal of the Ninth
Circuit and a corresponding assumption that
the numbers establish the premise: frequent
reversals must mean a liberal, out-of-step
circuit being reminded by the Supreme
Court that the Justices are in charge. The
reversal rates lead to a number of
observations:
First, the Ninth Circuit has been at the high
end of reversal rates, not just over the past
decade, but over the past thirty years. In
some years, the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate
has far exceeded the norm. In the 1984 term,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit twenty-seven times in twenty-eight
cases. In the 1996 term, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit ninety-five
percent of the time.
Second, more recently, the Ninth Circuit's
reversal rate has not been out of line with the
other circuits; but Ninth Circuit cases have
represented a disproportionate share of the
Supreme Court's argument docket, and
unanimous reversals have been
disproportionately high.
Third, the Ninth Circuit is not alone in
experiencing high reversal rates, but it has
had more bad years than some other circuits.
The Ninth Circuit has also carried more of
the burden of negative commentary,
although other circuits, for example, the
Fifth, have experienced some similar box-
score analysis.
Finally, some decisions of the Ninth Circuit
take on a liberal notoriety that is hard to
escape. Among these are the ruling striking
down the California three-strikes law and
the Pledge ruling. The second way the
premise is manifested is that the image
generated by the repetition of the statistics
takes on a life of its own in the news media
and in legal commentary, so that the
runaway liberal court becomes a recurring
theme used to explain legal developments
that may have no connection to this image.
Commentary on important rulings is
sometimes filtered through the prism of a
runaway court, rather than considering
decisions on their merits. Debatable but
plausible rulings, albeit controversial,
become products of the scofflaw liberal
judges of the Ninth Circuit.
This Essay first examines some Ninth
Circuit cases to raise questions about the
image of a conservative Supreme Court
regularly correcting renegade liberal judges.
Next, the Essay examines some of the
commentary to demonstrate how it
perpetuates the premise of the Ninth Circuit
as out of control.
The identification of judges in this Essay by
the President who appointed them is
intended as a proxy for whether they may be
likely to be liberal or conservative. The
point of this identification is not to reduce
the federal judiciary to partisan labels.
Rather, it is intended as a measure of how
likely it is that decisions by particular judges
should be considered part of a trend of
liberal jurists disregarding the mandate of
the Supreme Court.
II. THE CASES
The difficulty with the statistical analysis is
that it suggests an image that is much more
complex and nuanced than the numbers can
demonstrate. Even in the years of the Ninth
Circuit's worst records in the Supreme
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Court, the relationship between the two
courts has never been a monolithic one
capable of a single explanation or
transmitting a single message. While
anecdotal evidence is all that this Essay has
to offer, the anecdotes do demonstrate a
number of important internal differences that
the statistics do not. Of course, anecdotes
alone do not allow us to be comprehensive
in our conclusions.
The anecdotal themes include:
First, some Supreme Court reversals of the
Ninth Circuit involve cases of first
impression; the two courts may have
reached different results, but the Ninth
Circuit only became wrong because the
Supreme Court subsequently took a different
view.
Second, while there are many examples of
unanimous reversal of the Ninth Circuit,
there are also many cases in which the
Supreme Court vote was five-to-four; once
again, the Ninth Circuit may have been
wrong, but the Supreme Court vote indicates
that the decision was close.
Third, some reversals of Ninth Circuit
opinions involve panel opinions written by
judges appointed by Republican Presidents
Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, or
George W. Bush; therefore, it is erroneous to
claim that the reversals all fall on decisions
by judges appointed by Democratic
Presidents Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton.
Fourth, even when the panel opinion was
written by a Democratic judicial appointee,
many of the reversals occur in cases in
which the panel included judges appointed
by Republican Presidents.
Finally, when the Supreme Court reverses
the Ninth Circuit in intercircuit conflict
cases, the Ninth Circuit's position was
sometimes shared by other circuits.
There are numerous examples to illustrate
these points, and no attempt was made here
to be exhaustive or to quantify the cases in
each category. Rather, the point is that even
a sampling of examples is sufficient to
suggest what is missing from much
statistical analysis in this field.
A. First Impression
There are more recent examples of cases of
first impression. In its 2004 Term, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Raich v. Ashcroft, in which the
circuit panel had ruled that the state's
allowance of the use of marijuana for local
medicinal purposes was beyond the
regulation of Congress under the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The novel
question was resolved in a panel opinion by
Judge Harry Pregerson, appointed to U.S.
District Court by President Johnson and
elevated to the Ninth Circuit by President
Carter. The Supreme Court reversed, six-to-
three, ruling that the Commerce Clause
provided ample authority for application of
the federal Controlled Substances Act to
restrict state-approved use of medical
marijuana. Yet far from being an example of
a rogue, liberal court being pulled back by a
conservative one, the panel arguably made a
good faith effort to apply the federalism
rulings of the Rehnquist Court, only to be
reversed by a Supreme Court majority
seeking to limit the scope of the Court's new
federalism jurisprudence. The majority
opinion was written by Justice John Paul
Stevens, and the dissent by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, who made clear that the
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Ninth Circuit had followed the correct
analysis, at least from the standpoint of
those responsible for the Supreme Court's
principal federalism decisions.
B. Closely Divided Supreme Court
There is no shortage of examples in which
reversal of the Ninth Circuit was by a deeply
divided Supreme Court. While these cases
statistically count as reversals, they suggest
that the issues are close or that they
predictably bring out the fault line of
ideological divide. This was the case in
Lockyer v. Andrade, the Supreme Court
decision in favor of the California "three
strikes" law. The Supreme Court's reversal
of the Ninth Circuit was by a five-to-four
vote and fell along ideological lines. Did this
mean the lower court was out of line?
Perhaps it seemed that way to five members
of the Supreme Court, but not to the other
four. With the Court so divided and Justice
O'Connor casting the deciding vote and
writing the majority opinion, it is hard to say
that this counts as an example of a runaway
circuit court opinion.
C. Decisions Authored by Republican
Appointees
There are also cases in which the reversal
pattern does not fit the model for
controversy of liberal judges reversed by
conservative justices. In Lingle v. Chevron
US.A., the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit unanimously, but in doing so
rejected the use of an established test to
determine whether a Hawaii law was a
regulatory taking of private property. The
Hawaii law limited the rent an oil company
may charge a dealer that leases a gas station
owned by the company. The panel opinion,
which applied the existing test that a
regulation may be a taking if it "does not
substantially advance legitimate state
interests," was written by Judge Robert
Beezer, appointed to the Ninth Circuit by
President Reagan. One of the two panel
members appointed by Democratic
Presidents, Judge William Fletcher, wrote a
dissent. The Supreme Court opinion, written
by Justice O'Connor, reversed Judge Beezer
but did not adopt Judge Fletcher's dissent.
This hardly stands as a cause for alarm about
a circuit that needs to be carefully watched.
D. Republican Appointees Voting with
Majority
There is also a group of cases in which the
panel opinion was written by a judge
appointed by a Democratic President. In
these cases, there is more cause to scrutinize
whether liberal judges are simply out of step
with the more conservative superintendency
of the law by the Supreme Court. Yet
invariably this category, too, contains cases
that reflect a complexity not developed by
statistical analysis. This is most true when
the panel includes one or more judges
appointed by Republican Presidents who
join the Court's opinion.
Consider McNeil v. Middleton, a unanimous
Ninth Circuit panel ruling ordering a U.S.
District Court to grant a habeas corpus
petition in a second-degree murder case in
which the panel said a woman was deprived
of the ability to mount a defense and to have
a fair trial. The Supreme Court unanimously
and summarily reversed the panel, without
briefing or oral argument. While the opinion
was written by an appointee of President
Clinton, Judge Richard Paez, it was joined in
full by Judge Beezer, a Reagan appointee,
and by Judge Ferdinand Fernandez, who was
named to the U.S. District Court by
President Reagan and elevated to the circuit
by the first President Bush. It is fair to say
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that liberal judges are sometimes criticized
for being too sympathetic to habeas claims,
but in this instance, the habeas claims were
accepted not only by Judge Paez but also by
two Republican appointees as well.
E. Circuit Splits
Finally, there is a category of rulings in
which the Ninth Circuit was reversed but
was in agreement with the positions of one
or more of its sister circuits. There are
numerous instances of this. An example
illustrates the point that the Supreme Court
could just as easily have used the rulings of
other circuits to reverse at another time, and
it may be little more than a coincidence that
a Ninth Circuit case was chosen. In United
States v. Martinez-Salazar, the Ninth Circuit
had found a Fifth Amendment due process
violation when a judge refused to dismiss a
juror for cause in a criminal case, the
defendant used a peremptory challenge
against the juror, and the defendant ran out
of peremptory strikes. The panel opinion
was written by Judge Michael Daly
Hawkins, an appointee of President Clinton;
it was joined by Judge Stephen Reinhardt,
an appointee of President Carter and a
frequent target for criticism of the Ninth
Circuit. Judge Pamela Rymer, a U.S. District
Court appointee of President Reagan,
elevated to the Ninth Circuit by the first
President Bush, dissented. The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the Ninth
Circuit in an opinion written by Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, who specifically noted that
the First and Fifth Circuits had adopted a
position that shared the Ninth Circuit's view,
while the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits38
disagreed with the Ninth. The Supreme
Court, then, could have handled this issue in
a case from another circuit; had it done so,
the case would not have been reflected in the
Ninth Circuit's reversal rates.
In the use of all of these anecdotes, there is a
modest goal: to demonstrate that the reversal
rate of the Ninth Circuit is made up of
different component parts that are far more
subtle and nuanced, and perhaps incapable
of a single explanation, than statistical
studies are able to show. Judges of all
ideological stripes get reversed by a
Supreme Court moving in different
directions, most often conservative, but
sometimes more moderate.
III. THE COMMENTARY
It is difficult to document and assess the
effect of a bandwagon of commentary.
However, some useful observations are
possible. The fascination in the news media
with the record of the various courts of
appeals and voting patterns may be traced to
the early 1980s when President Reagan
began to populate those courts with more
conservative judges to join the moderate-to-
liberal jurists placed on the bench by
President Carter. As the circuits began to
reflect the presence of conservatives, the
media began to write about the circuits. This
was reflected in a May 1983 series in the
National Law Journal. At the time, Reagan
had not yet placed any judges on the Ninth
Circuit, but one article had a prescient
quality:
Finally, it comes down to politics. For
example, the 9th Circuit has (23)
judges-most appointed by Democrats
and none appointed by President
Reagan. The Supreme Court has nine
justices-seven of whom were
appointed by Republican presidents.
"It's a matter of personnel," said Johns
Hopkins' Professor [J. Woodford]
Howard. But, he added, "It can change
very quickly."
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By the fall of 1984, the Knight-Ridder
newspapers carried a report on the opening
of the Supreme Court term by reporter
Aaron Epstein, who described the Court's
decision to review an antipornography law
from the state of Washington. He noted that
the law "was ruled unconstitutional by the
liberal Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
in California, the most overruled appellate
tribunal in the nation during the last
Supreme Court term."
That is just one instance of the link between
the liberal Ninth Circuit and the reversal rate
being tied together and published, but it is
significant for two reasons. First, it shows
the connection between ideology and
reversal rate being made in media
commentary, although no information was
offered to provide support for the
connection. Second, this discussion of the
image of the Ninth Circuit took place more
than twenty years ago and seemed to have
been almost entirely forgotten when, a
decade later, a new generation of
commentary about Ninth Circuit reversals
burst on the scene as if it were a newly
discovered phenomenon.
By 1985, the National Law Journal began to
publish an end-of-the-term Supreme Court
Review, which included a box score on the
record of the circuits and of state courts in
the Supreme Court. This continued to focus
attention on reversal rates and on the Ninth
Circuit's record, although that record
seemed to fluctuate substantially.
By the time the pattern of Supreme Court
treatment of the Ninth Circuit appeared to
change, beginning in 2002, some
commentary suggested that there were
lasting residual effects. In the last several
years the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate has
been right at about the average, overall
reversal rate. However, cases from the Ninth
Circuit have made up a substantial and
disproportionately large fraction of the
Supreme Court's argued docket, as much as
one-third of the roughly seventy-five cases
argued each term.
This new phenomenon has evoked a number
of possible explanations. One in particular,
suggested by University of Pittsburgh Law
School Professor Arthur Hellman, is cause
for concern. An article in 2004 in The
Recorder, a California legal newspaper and
news service, reported, "'You have to
wonder whether the [Supreme Court] law
clerks don't take a special look at 9th cases,'
said Hellman, who closely follows the 9th
Circuit. It's like a 'self-reinforcing
phenomenon because they've taken so many
in the past that it becomes the focus of
attention,' he speculated."
CONCLUSION
In a sense this last observation completes the
cycle. Having been branded with a
reputation for reversals and an image for
runaway liberalism, the Ninth Circuit's
decisions may now be subject to even closer
scrutiny. This is so, regardless of whether
the reputation was ever supported by fact or
was merely a product of politics,
bandwagons, and overemphasis of statistics.
The Ninth Circuit may in fact have been the
most liberal circuit during the past twenty-
five years. However, before the reputation of
the circuit and its members is sullied by
being mocked as too liberal and out of
control, an effort should be made to move
beyond a quantitative analysis that is
necessarily detached from an examination of
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values and content. Any evaluation of the
circuit should be based on the substance and
nature of its rulings, not simply on a box
score.
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